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This article analyzes the impact of party strategies on the issue structure, and conse-
quently the dimensional structure, of party systems across europe. Conceptualizing 
political competition in two dimensions (economic left-right and social traditionalism 
versus liberalism), the authors demonstrate that political parties in both eastern and 
Western europe contest the issue composition of political space. The authors argue that 
large, mainstream parties are invested in the dimensional status quo, preferring to com-
pete on the primary dimension by emphasizing economic issues. Systematically disad-
vantaged niche parties, conversely, prefer to compete along a secondary dimension by 
stressing social issues. adopting such a strategy enables niche parties to divert voter 
attention and challenge the structure of conflict between the major partisan competitors. 
The authors test these propositions using the 2006 iteration of the Chapel Hill expert 
Surveys on Party Positions. Findings indicate that while the structure of political con-
flict in eastern versus Western europe could not be more different, the logic with which 
parties compete in their respective systems is the same. The authors conclude that 
political competition is primarily a struggle over dimensionality; it does not merely 
occur along issue dimensions but also over their content.
Keywords:  political parties; political competition; economic issues; social issues; 
niche parties
This article builds on giovanni Sartori’s assertion that extreme parties “neither desire nor have much to gain in competing centripetally. Their goals are best 
furthered by tearing the system apart.”1 We agree that, unlike mainstream parties, 
disadvantaged parties aim to “tear the system apart.” Contrary to Sartori, however, 
we do not see political competition as a struggle over polarization on the left-right 
continuum. To disrupt the system, disadvantaged parties rather seek to increase the 
salience of independent, unaligned political issues. We thus understand political com-
petition as a struggle over the connections linking political issues—a struggle over 
political dimensionality.
Issue connections arise from continuous formulation of political ideologies, and 
as a result, they are both historically rooted and dynamically changing. This article 
analyzes the political issue composition of european party systems. We confirm that 
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while political competition across the continent revolves around two dimensions (eco-
nomic left-right and social traditionalism versus liberalism), the connection between 
these dimensions differs starkly across eastern and Western europe because of their 
unique histories. While Western parties connect the economic left with social liberal-
ism and economic right with social conservatism, the opposite is true for parties in 
the east.
This blunt divergence in the structure of political competition across europe begs 
the question whether the regions constitute two different political worlds or whether 
political competition functions analogously across the continent. To address this 
question, this article examines the impact of party strategies on the issue structure of 
party systems across the regions of europe. We demonstrate that political parties in 
europe contest the issue composition of political space. We argue that large, main-
stream parties are invested in the dimensional status quo, preferring to compete over 
the primary, economic dimension. Systemically disadvantaged niche parties, conversely, 
compete chiefly along a secondary, social dimension. By increasing the salience of 
secondary social issues, niche parties across both regions of europe challenge the 
structure of conflict between the major partisan competitors.
We firstly develop a basis for systemic comparison of political dimensionality 
by using a simple framework that captures variation within and across eastern and 
Western europe2 and thereby places individual polities on the same rubric. Our 
approach highlights that while the structure of political conflict is diametrically 
different in the east and the West, the logic with which parties compete in their 
respective systems is the same. Finally, this study underscores the fact that politi-
cal competition does not occur merely along issue dimensions but also over their 
content.
Generating Political Space
Politics is about issues. There exist a multiplicity of political concerns that are 
empirically separate. The plethora of issues that matter, however, easily becomes over-
whelmingly complex and intellectually incomprehensible. For the sake of simplifica-
tion, issues become connected into packages of values that serve as informational 
shortcuts.3 For example, whether a highway should be built through a community is 
essentially separate from whether the same community should develop a recycling 
program. However, views on both of these issues are likely to be guided by concerns 
about the environment and economic costs.
The concept of political space is a generalized description of the landscape of 
political issues that are contested in a given society. It outlines the particular political 
issue-components that arise in various political systems and thus delimits the dimen-
sions of the ideological arena in which political parties can position themselves and 
compete for support. Due to its capacity of outlining party positioning, it retains the 
 at Sciences Po on July 16, 2014eep.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
58  east european Politics and Societies
ability to depict strategic competition among parties, while simultaneously provid-
ing a comparable ideological backdrop by summarizing the dimensional structure 
in a particular political system or a set of systems.
The dimensional structure of political space can be constructed either inductively—
utilizing data on actual party or voter positions4—or deductively—addressing which 
sets of issues are theoretically likely to form primary dimensions.5 Furthermore, with 
both induction and deduction, the specific dimensions can be derived at different 
aggregation levels—a specific party, a specific system, or a number of systems. The 
trade-off is one between specificity (inductive, low level of aggregation) and general-
ity (deductive, high level of aggregation).
authors working on these questions agree that dimensionality is an empirical issue 
and that dimensions are latent and contextual.6 each system is likely to have different 
primary dimensions that matter the most. Due to ideological links of positions on 
different dimensions, many authors identify a “master dimension,” which is generally 
labeled as the left-right and is taken to define party competition in a given system.7 
This allows spatial representation of political contest and enables spatial analysis of 
competition that occurs within each system.
What is lost, however, is comparability. assessing party competition within system-
specific dimensionality effectively atomizes the representation of competition. analysts 
can identify competition in separate political spaces, commonly using the shorthand 
terminology of left-right, but it is clear that this left-right differs from system to system. 
The ultimate weakness of this representation is that it is impossible to tell what the 
differences between the various independent left-right scales are. Furthermore, the 
traditional left-right conception precludes the conceptualization, and subsequently 
measurement and analysis, of the potential change in issue composition of this master 
dimension. Understanding the dimensional variation of political competition and being 
able to represent it spatially is important for addressing the dynamics and nature of 
political competition more generally.
We therefore argue for the utility of deductive structuring of dimensions at a higher 
level of aggregation, with the aim of conceptually constructing a general political 
space. Using expert judgments as priors, it is useful to identify a small-n of dimen-
sions, which are salient in a given set of political systems.8 Such conceptualization 
of a broadly applicable and stable political space allows for the comparison of party 
positioning across systems, providing a baseline for measuring the structure of politi-
cal competition.
Axis of Competition
Political parties do not position themselves randomly within political space. 
Instead, they situate themselves along the dimensions of political space based on their 
ideological outlooks and strategic calculations. Ideology constrains political space. 
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Parties formulate ideologies that connect all of their positions across theoretically and 
empirically separable dimensions and that provide a common, simplified language for 
expressing political values and are also concretely connected to particular policy pre-
scriptions, subsequently providing expectations of political actors and bases for evalu-
ating their performance. This infuses the political system with stability, by constraining 
political actors, as well as with legitimacy of rule, by granting them a political mandate. 
“Politics without ideology is babel.”9 Strategically, political parties interact with oppos-
ing parties, thus “carving out” areas of political space for themselves. Parties not only 
change their positioning on various dimensions, but they also change the salience 
invested into particular dimensions.10
The axis of competition summarizes the main fault line in a society and highlights 
the structure of party positioning. In a two-dimensional political space, the axis of 
party competition can be expressed as the relationship between party positioning on 
dimension x and dimension y:
 y = a + bx, (1)
where a is the intercept, while b represents the slope of the competition axis in the 
two-dimensional political space. This slope outlines the proportion between competi-
tion occurring along dimension x (b → 0) or dimension y (b → ∞).
Figure 1 illustrates two possibilities. In the left panel, parties position themselves 
in all four quadrants of the two-dimensional political space. There is no correlation 
between dimensions x and y and therefore no discernable axis of party competition. 
In the right panel, parties align along a clear competition axis, which depicts the cor-
relation between dimensions x and y.
Theory of Party Competition
Political competition reflects the interplay between popular political interests 
and partisan strategies. While citizen preferences underlie the issue composition of 
political space, it is political parties that—partially and strategically—translate these 
issues into political conflict. Political competition becomes a struggle over issue 
linkages, that is to say, over the dimensional configuration of political space. Parties 
decide whether to compete along the competition axis—that is, along the predomi-
nant dimension—or whether to highlight other, unaligned issues, thus increasing the 
dimensional complexity of political space. This determines the content of political 
debate, as well as the political crevices in which different parties may dwell. The 
costs and benefits of this issue competition, however, are not uniform across politi-
cal actors.
Mainstream parties, likely to have long-standing roots in society as well as orga-
nizational apparatuses and linkages within political institutions, face much higher 
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sunk costs of reputation and identity. a newly emergent, unaligned issue may recon-
figure the bundling of political issues in such a way that a major incumbent party finds 
itself internally divided on certain issues. If these issues carry significant salience, the 
unity of the party is threatened.11 Furthermore, increased dimensionality, which results 
from the introduction of an unaligned issue, inserts systemic instability. It provides 
additional planes of party competition, making equilibrium positions increasingly 
difficult—if not impossible—to reach.12 Systems with high dimensionality can thus 
be expected to be systems of greater flux, which reduces a major party capacity of 
constructing coalitions and maintaining power.
an established mainstream party therefore benefits from the dimensional status 
quo and focuses on defining political conflict through the prisms of the standing 
dimensions—dimensions that provide it with stable electorates as well as a predictable 
set of coalition partners.13 Indeed, it is such parties that strive for the Lipset-Rokkanian 
“freezing” of party systems along a stable competition axis.14 Since they are likely to be 
the historical cocreators of the character of their domestic political space and since they 
are ideologically invested in the primary political fault lines (along which the compe-
tition axis runs), it is these established mainstream parties that compete along the 
predominant dimension of the political system.
Niche parties are younger political organizations that arise to pursue a specific 
issue or a narrow set of issues that have potential supporters in the electorate but that 
have been (often deliberately) neglected by other parties.15 Unlike mainstream par-
ties, these parties tend to be marginalized on the main political dimension.16 While the 
competition axis frames political skirmishes between the major mainstream parties, 
these disadvantaged political parties seek to avoid being caught in the crossfire. 
Figure 1
Axis of Competition in Two-Dimensional Political Space
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To this end, two options exist. One is for niche parties to take extreme positions on 
the primary dimension. Recent work by ezrow on niche party electoral success and 
failure indicates that this can be a beneficial strategy.17 He finds that niche parties 
adopting extreme left-right positions garner more votes than those taking more 
moderate (or centrist) positions. This dimension, however, tends to be crowded with 
mainstream parties, making it difficult for other parties to enter the political system 
by emphasizing traditional left-right issues. Consequently, the preferred option of niche 
parties is often to exploit new issues on which their established mainstream opponents 
have no determined positions or—even better—on which they might be internally 
divided.18 Indeed, the source of niche party political identity is frequently their differ-
entiation from the major parties along these secondary inferior issues or along nonpol-
icy issues, such as valence or antisystemic orientation. given the pervasiveness of the 
primary conflict, these parties continue to contest the dominant political issues; how-
ever, they favor emphasizing secondary issues. Niche parties aim to “tear the system 
apart” by trying to increase the salience of previously tangential issues, thus reor-
ganizing the structure of political space, redirecting voter attention, and potentially 
capturing votes from mainstream parties.
Such strategies force mainstream parties to react by either ignoring the new issues 
or, in case they do garner significant support in the electorate, engaging them. 
Meguid highlights how in certain cases mainstream parties benefit from jumping 
on the bandwagon by emphasizing new niche issues that divide or embarrass their 
mainstream competitors.19 In these scenarios, mainstream parties are rational to 
draw attention to these new issues. They will, however, do so only after the new issue 
has been introduced. Mainstream parties are unlikely to risk political capital, internal 
unity, and coalition potential by spearheading novel, unaligned issues, whose 
political leverage is inherently uncertain. Furthermore, when mainstream parties 
engage newly introduced issues, they do so with the ultimate aim of translating 
them into their ideological issue-bundle.20 This strategic dynamic eventually leads 
to the absorption of the new issue and to the realignment of party positioning along 
an updated political continuum, effectively amounting to the “turning” of the compe-
tition axis.21
Three hypotheses emerge from the preceding theoretical discussion of party strat-
egies within political space:
1. Major/mainstream parties seek to preserve the dimensional status quo by investing 
salience in the primary issues of political competition.
2. Niche parties struggle to introduce and invest salience into new issues that do not 
easily fit into the standing issue structure in order to wrest attention.
3. When a new, potent political issue is introduced into the political system, it is most 
likely to be eventually adopted by mainstream parties and made to “fit” the long-
standing issue composition.
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Political Space in Europe
Scholars of european politics have deductively defined contemporary european 
party competition in two dimensions.22 The first dimension relates to economics, 
generally spanning from state-directed redistribution on the one end to market allo-
cation on the other end. The second dimension relates to social issues, concerning 
such factors as sexual lifestyles, national identity, or religious values, and spans from 
libertarian or alternative politics to authoritarian or traditional politics.23 These 
authors further deduce a linkage between these dimensions—thus theorizing an axis 
of competition—whereby in Western europe redistributive economic positioning cor-
responds with socially liberal politics. In eastern europe, where opposition to com-
munist redistributive and authoritarian rule has structured post-communist politics, 
these same dimensions exist. Strikingly, however, the axis of competition has the 
opposite slope, linking traditionalism and authoritarianism with the economically 
redistributive left.24
We evaluate the political space across Western and eastern europe in 2006 using 
data from the latest round of the Chapel Hill expert Survey on party positioning.25 
The survey provides data on 227 political parties across the eU-27 (minus Luxembourg, 
Malta, and Cyprus). Similar to previous iterations of the project,26 the 2006 survey 
includes questions about party positioning on the economic left-right dimension and 
the new politics dimension, as well as on european integration—both in general and 
in specific policy areas. Importantly for our purposes, the 2006 data set also includes 
systematic information on party positions and salience of fourteen policy issues (see 
the appendix for details). These new data allow us to more accurately assess the con-
tent of the dimensions of political contestation and to test our hypotheses concerning 
party strategies.
We begin our examination of the political space in europe by considering the 
structure of the two dimensions in question. Do the positions political parties take 
on various issues cohere into distinct economic and social dimensions? What is the 
content of these dimensions (i.e., which issues stick together)? To what extent, if at 
all, does this content differ across regions? To address these questions, we employ 
the expert survey data mentioned above and conduct a principal component analysis 
on the positions parties hold on the fourteen policy issues. The results are reported 
in Table 1.
Consistent with the literature on party competition in europe, our analysis yields 
two clear factors (i.e., dimensions), the content of which are remarkably similar across 
regions.27 On the one hand, policies related to the role of government and personal 
responsibility (as well as the position of the United States in world affairs) generate a 
clear “economic” factor. On the other hand, policies related to civil liberties, immi-
gration, religion, cosmopolitism, and so forth form a discernable “social” factor.
 at Sciences Po on July 16, 2014eep.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Rovny and edwards / Struggle over Dimensionality  63
Two policy areas—european integration and civil liberties versus law and order 
(in the case of the West)—are notable for their failure to load clearly on one factor 
over the other. Indeed, their relatively high scores on both factors suggest that these 
issues are related to both dimensions of political contestation. More provocatively, 
the results provide insight into contemporary party strategy, suggesting a possible 
shift of these two policy issues from one dimension to another (i.e., from the social 
to the economic dimension).28 This finding is in line with our expectations regard-
ing mainstream parties’ efforts to translate new issues into the predominant conflict 
dimension as a strategy for maintaining the status quo.
Thus far, our analyses have confirmed the existence of an economic and a social 
dimension in europe and have spoken to the content of these two dimensions, but 
how do these dimensions interact to formulate an axis of competition? In other words, 
what is the dimensional structure of political space in europe? Moreover, does this 
dimensional structure differ in the east and the West? We ascertain this by running a 
series of simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for each of the twenty-four 
Table 1
Factor Analysis of Policy Positions
West east
Factor 1 
(Social)
Factor 2 
(economic)
Factor 1 
(Social)
Factor 2 
(economic)
eU integration –.510 .587 –.558 .559
Public services vs. reduced taxes .377 .856 –.011 .944
Deregulation .226 .919 –.060 .974
Redistribution .357 .871 –.018 .957
Civil liberties vs. law and order .831 .453 .882 –.291
Social lifestyle .894 .188 .835 –.191
Role of religion in politics .730 .378 .625 .053
Immigration policy .824 .386 .890 –.095
Multiculturalism vs. assimilation .874 .362 .927 .057
Urban vs. rural interests .648 .076 .374 –.571
Cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism .911 .020 .918 –.135
Regional/local decentralization .281 .136 .459 –.059
U.S. leadership in world affairs .343 .854 .042 .813
ethnic minority issues .880 .319 .852 .035
Factor analysis eigenvalue Proportion eigenvalue Proportion
Factor 1 (Social) 8.102 .448 6,337 .411
Factor 2 (economic) 2.364 .300 3.631 .301
N 110 62
Source: 2006 Chapel Hill expert Survey on Party Positioning.
Note: Principal component analysis employing varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization.
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countries utilizing expert survey questions relating to the ideological positions of 
political parties—specifically their stances on economic issues (economic left/right) 
and on democratic freedoms and rights (tan/gal) (see the appendix for question word-
ing). Modifying equation (1), we formalize the axis of party competition with the 
following equation:
 tan/gal = a + b economic left/right. (2)
The results reported in Figures 2 and 3 and Table 2 provide striking evidence of the 
dimensional structure described by party scholars as well as of the postulated rela-
tionship between the two major dimensions and the differences between this rela-
tionship in Western and eastern europe. Turning first to the graphs, it is clear that 
political parties do not place themselves haphazardly within the political space, but 
rather do so along discernable competition axes that link their positioning on the 
separate dimensions. Moreover, Figure 2 bolsters previous findings by Marks et al. 
as well as Vachudova and Hooghe that the axis of party competition is negative in 
Western europe but runs in the opposite direction in the east.29 Notably, however, 
our findings suggest that these regional discrepancies no longer hold across all 
Central and eastern eU member states. as Figure 3 highlights, the Baltic countries 
of estonia and Latvia as well as Slovakia and Slovenia follow the pattern typical in 
the West. For Latvia, Slovakia, and Slovenia—the countries for which we have com-
parable 2002 data—these results indicate a shift in the axis of party competition over 
time. The relationship between the dimensions in these three countries has reversed, 
as parties no longer appear to couple left economically redistributive ideologies with 
Figure 2
Political Space and Axes of Party Competition in Europe
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traditional and authoritarian values but seem to link them with socially liberal and 
alternative values.
While the empirical findings depicted in Figures 2 and 3 reveal distinguishable 
competition axes, the slopes of these axes differ significantly from country to coun-
try. We are mainly interested in the “steepness” of these slopes, as this provides insight 
into which dimension—economic or social—carries more weight in a given system. 
a “steep” axis of competition (|b| → ∞) suggests that political conflict in the given 
society runs predominantly along the social dimension, while a “flat” axis (|b| → 0) 
points to the centrality of conflict over the economic dimension. Referring to Table 2, 
for example, we find that the Netherlands, Finland, and Slovakia have relatively flat 
slopes, indicating that political conflict tends to revolve around economic issues; 
while austria, Poland, Slovenia, and several of the Mediterranean countries have 
steeper slopes, indicating that social issues are significantly important.
Our examination of the structure of party positioning within the political systems 
of europe suggests that while diversity in the issue content of political competition 
exists, the economic dimension is pervasive in all countries. This is most visible from 
the fact that although some axes of competition are steeper than others, only four 
countries—austria, Spain, Poland, and Slovenia—have axes steeper than 45 degrees.30 
Only in these countries is the competition axis more aligned with the social dimension 
than with the economic dimension. Moreover, this alignment is still very slight, and 
parties continue to significantly differentiate their positions on the economic dimen-
sion. In all other countries, party positions differ more extensively on the economic 
than on the social dimension, suggesting the unremitting centrality of this dimension 
Figure 3
Political Space and Axes of Party Competition in Eastern Europe
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to their political competition. Indeed the economic divide, which has pitted the eco-
nomic left against the right and structured european party competition throughout the 
twentieth century, remains crucial to political competition today.
Party Type and Dimensionality
The findings presented in the previous section emphasize the tenacity of redistribu-
tive conflict in europe, underlining the forty-year-old insights of Lipset and Rokkan.31 
However, given the varying logics guiding the competition strategies of distinct types 
of political parties, we expect to see major parties investing increased salience into the 
main economic dimension and niche parties attempting to attract attention by investing 
salience in the secondary issues contained in the social dimension.
Table 2
Slopes and Fit Measures of Competition Axes in Europe
Country R2 Slope
austria .634 –1.226
Belgium .215 –0.580
Denmark .209 –0.468
germany .248 –0.419
greece .225 –0.402
Finland .101 –0.279
France .788 –0.928
Ireland .580 –0.720
Italy .595 –0.930
Netherlands .131 –0.230
Portugal .871 –0.967
Spain .957 –1.395
Sweden .528 –0.403
United Kingdom .710 –0.878
Bulgaria .531 0.621
Czech Republic .447 0.415
estonia .471 –0.614
Hungary .982 0.869
Latvia .353 –0.359
Lithuania .064 0.352
Poland .695 1.044
Romania .720 0.748
Slovakia .026 –0.117
Slovenia .746 –1.491
Note: estimates are obtained using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Significance is not reported 
since the aim is to obtain best fit of the positioning of the population of parties. Results are weighted 
by vote.
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To test this hypothesis, we perform a principal component analysis on the level 
of the salience parties attribute to fourteen different policy issues (see Table 3). 
Similar to our analysis of the position of parties on these issues, this yields two clear 
factors—the first emphasizing social issues and the second economic issues.32 Using 
these factor scores, we create two salience variables: salience of social issues and 
salience of economic issues. We evaluate the varying strategies of political parties 
by predicting the level of issue salience using party attributes, namely, party vote share 
and party type (niche party), while controlling for government membership and 
positioning on the two ideological dimensions tan/gal and economic left-right.
Table 4 summarizes the findings of the OLS regression analysis predicting the 
levels of salience of social and economic issues by party vote and party type. 
Following recent studies by adams et al. and Meguid,33 we operationalize party type 
by distinguishing niche parties (i.e., extreme left, extreme right, green, and regional/
ethnic parties) from mainstream parties.34 Our analysis suggests that social issues are 
important to niche parties. On average, niche parties place 18 percent more emphasis 
on social issues than their nonniche counterparts.35 In contrast, economic issues are 
important to parties that receive a larger proportion of votes. On average, a party that 
receives 10 percent more votes will emphasize economic issues 3 percent more.36
Table 3
Factor Analysis of Salience of Policy Positions
Salience Factor Loadings Factor 1 (Social) Factor 2 (economic)
eU integration –.136 .058
Taxes vs. spending .065 .884
Deregulation .029 .787
Redistribution .128 .628
Civil liberties vs. law and order .699 .309
Lifestyle issues .717 .182
Religious principles .549 –.104
Immigration policy .837 .161
Multiculturalism vs. assimilation .826 .084
Urban vs. rural issues –.116 –.143
Cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism .628 –.458
Regional/local decentralization .310 –.206
U.S. power in world affairs .483 .442
ethnic minority issues .745 –.263
Factor analysis eigenvalue Proportion
Factor 1 (Social) 4.018 .287
Factor 2 (economic) 2.506 .179
N = 175
Source: 2006 Chapel Hill expert Survey on Party Positioning.
Note: Principal component analysis employing varimax rotation.
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additional evidence is presented in Table 5, which includes a summary of the 
salience attributed to social and economic issues by party type and region. The fig-
ures shore up our OLS results, suggesting that niche parties invest salience into 
Table 4
Predicting Salience of Policy Issues
east and West West east
Social 
Factor
economic 
Factor
Social 
Factor
economic 
Factor
Social 
Factor
economic 
Factor
Vote share –0.00154 0.0211*** –0.00211 0.0174** –0.0100 0.0208**
(0.0068) (0.0065) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.012) (0.011)
Niche party 1.003*** –0.177 0.797*** –0.237 0.764*** –0.512**
(0.18) (0.17) (0.22) (0.22) (0.28) (0.27)
government 
membership
–0.0704 –0.0496 –0.0197 0.275 –0.0314 –0.259
(0.18) (0.17) (0.22) (0.22) (0.26) (0.25)
Tan/gal –0.0658** 0.192*** –0.0761** 0.122*** –0.111** 0.208***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.038) (0.038) (0.054) (0.052)
economic 
Left/right
0.0779** –0.0100 0.0674* –0.0914** 0.0544 0.000746
(0.036) (0.034) (0.050) (0.050) (0.060) (0.057)
Constant –0.989*** 0.851*** –0.644** 1.032*** –1.418*** 0.784*
N 170 170 107 107 63 63
R2 .23 .29 .23 .29 .21 .37
Note: estimates obtained using OLS regression. Niche party is a dummy variable, scored 1 if party is a 
radical left, radical right, green, or regionalist party. government membership is a dummy variable, scored 
1 if party was in government in 2006.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01 (one-tailed).
Table 5
Summary of Salience Factor Means by Party Type and Region
east and West West east
Party Type
Social 
Factor
economic 
Factor
Social 
Factor
economic 
Factor
Social 
Factor
economic 
Factor
Niche (extreme left and 
right, green, and 
ethnoregional)
 .606 –.126  .715 .064  .142 –.934
Small (nonniche and 
vote ≤ 15 percent)
–.222 –.066  .227 .190 –.630 –.298
Major (nonniche and 
vote > 15 percent)
–.392  .212 –.208 .312 –.682  .053
Note: Means of salience factors generated through principal component analysis (see above), distributed 
N (0,1). The social factor ranges from –2.65 to 2.79. The economic factor ranges from –4.11 to 2.14.
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social issues, while major parties emphasize economic issues. Furthermore, Table 5 
calls attention to the fact that small parties (parties with vote share ≤ 15 percent) not 
falling into the niche category behave differently from both niche and major parties. 
They seem to devote relatively little attention to either social or economic issues. 
Niche parties devote significantly more attention to the social issues, which form the 
secondary dimension of competition, while small nonniche parties choose to down-
play policy issues altogether. Meanwhile, economic issues remain the prerogative of 
major parties.
These findings underscore the endeavor of mainstream parties to contain politi-
cal competition within the dimensional confines that are advantageous to them. The 
mainstream parties of europe—those that have traditionally contested the structure 
of european economies and the construction of social systems—seek to preserve 
the pervasiveness of the economic dimension, which is their home turf. They thus 
invest increased salience into the issues that are contained in this dimension. 
Conversely, challengers in the political systems (i.e., niche parties) attempt to break 
this status quo by vesting increased salience in the secondary issues, contained in 
the social dimension.
Importantly, these logics of competition are virtually identical across the european 
continent. While eastern european party systems have been molded by their com-
munist heritage, leading to polar differences in party positioning, the current strategic 
forces shaping party competition are the same as those in the West. The major left-
wing parties of eastern europe have decisively embraced the new political system of 
liberal democracy and market capitalism. Redefined as social democratic parties, they 
contest the contours of specific policies as established mainstream members of their 
party systems. The role of “tearing the system apart” is thus left to the disadvantaged 
niche parties, who—by emphasizing secondary, unaligned issues—act the same way 
as their Western counterparts.
Concluding Remarks
Politics is fundamentally a struggle over dimensional issue composition, with 
political parties strategically vying not only to position themselves along ideological 
dimensions but also—and perhaps more importantly—to influence the content of 
these dimensions. Describing political competition through the notorious left-right 
lens unfortunately hinders our investigation of such dynamics and prohibits systemic 
comparison by lumping disparate political concerns into one continuum. We there-
fore choose to conceptualize political competition in terms of political space—an 
approach that allows us to parsimoniously describe the structure of political compe-
tition, while capturing essential differences among political systems. This notion 
is paramount in understanding the strategic dynamics of political parties. Indeed, 
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examining how parties jockey within this political space sheds light on parties’ varied 
strategies, revealing that while mainstream parties cling to the status quo by continu-
ally emphasizing conventional issues, niche parties consciously seek to skirt the 
confines of traditional political competition by stressing new or alternative issues.
analyzing contemporary party politics in europe through this theoretical lens 
yields important insights. To begin, when we deductively generate political space 
and plot political parties within this space, a picture of competitive diversity across 
europe emerges—both in terms of the issue content of the political dimensions 
uncovered and in terms of the shape of the axes of competition. While parties in 
some systems clearly differentiate themselves along a particular dimension, parties 
in other systems are distinguished along alternate lines. Moreover, we find that this 
variation increasingly cuts across regions, spanning the east as well as the West.
Our evidence also indicates that despite the aforementioned diversity, the perva-
siveness of the economic dimension remains. The continued dominance of this 
dimension in contemporary european politics—again this finding holds in both the 
east and the West—speaks to the consistent importance of redistributive issues to 
citizens and consequently to politics. However, it also highlights an important, and 
seemingly successful, strategy by mainstream political parties to preserve the status 
quo, namely, their conscious choice to compete on familiar and popular redistribu-
tive issues or, if need be, to force newer and often disruptive issues into the dominant 
economic dimension.
Perhaps most importantly, our article provides evidence that the dimensional struc-
ture of politics is the core subject of political contest. To be certain, political competi-
tion revolves around individual political issues. Political parties and party leaders do 
not think in terms of abstract issue dimensions. Their strategies, however, take dimen-
sionality into account by addressing and seeking to alter linkages between political 
issues. While major parties are vested in the status quo, niche parties attempt to break 
their competitors’ advantage by highlighting unrelated political issues with the aim to 
divert political conflict to a different dimension. Thus, major parties battling for gov-
ernment control differentiate themselves along the primary dimension of conflict, 
while minor parties—constrained by the dominance of their major rivals—are strate-
gically driven to exploit other political issues or to compete on nonpolicy issues 
altogether. Rather than “stretching” the political system, as suggested by Sartori, these 
parties seek to sidestep the main line of competition, “tearing the system apart” in new 
directions or abandoning its confines altogether.
Finally, though much has been made of the distinctiveness and incomparability 
of political competition in Western versus eastern europe, what stands out to us is 
the remarkable (and increasing) similarity. While the structure of competition 
remains distinct, the discrepancies appear to be waning as the axes of competition in 
eastern and Central european countries begin to mimic the overall pattern found in 
the West. Furthermore, our observations concerning strategic dynamics—for example, 
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niche parties stressing the social dimension over the economic dimension—hold in 
the east and the West. Our findings thus highlight that despite the different histories 
and recent trajectories, the logic of competition is the same across the european 
continent.
Appendix
Questionnaire Wording
The following is an excerpt from the 2006 Chapel Hill expert Survey.
Ideological Positions
We now turn to a few questions on the ideological positions of political parties in [COUNTRY] 
in 2006.
Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic 
left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right 
emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, 
less government spending, and a leaner welfare state.
 extreme Left Center extreme Right
Party a 0↓↓↓1↓↓↓2↓↓↓3↓↓↓4↓↓↓5↓↓↓6↓↓↓7↓↓↓8↓↓↓9↓↓↓10
Party B 0↓↓↓1↓↓↓2↓↓↓3↓↓↓4↓↓↓5↓↓↓6↓↓↓7↓↓↓8↓↓↓9↓↓↓10
Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. 
“Libertarian” or “post-materialist” parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, 
access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriages, or greater democratic 
participation. “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties often reject these ideas; they value 
order and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority.
 Libertarian/ Center Traditional/ 
 Postmaterialist  authoritarian
Party a 0↓↓↓1↓↓↓2↓↓↓3↓↓↓4↓↓↓5↓↓↓6↓↓↓7↓↓↓8↓↓↓9↓↓↓10
Party B 0↓↓↓1↓↓↓2↓↓↓3↓↓↓4↓↓↓5↓↓↓6↓↓↓7↓↓↓8↓↓↓9↓↓↓10
Policy Dimensions
Finally, some questions on where political parties stood on the following policy dimensions 
in [COUNTRY] in 2006.
On each dimension, we ask you to assess the position of the party leadership and then to 
assess the importance/salience of this dimension for a party’s public stance.
(continued)
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Appendix (continued)
Position on improving public services vs. reducing taxes.
 Strongly favors improving Strongly favors 
 public services reducing taxes
Party a 0↓↓↓1↓↓↓2↓↓↓3↓↓↓4↓↓↓5↓↓↓6↓↓↓7↓↓↓8↓↓↓9↓↓↓10
Party B 0↓↓↓1↓↓↓2↓↓↓3↓↓↓4↓↓↓5↓↓↓6↓↓↓7↓↓↓8↓↓↓9↓↓↓10
Importance/salience of improving public services vs. reducing taxes for each of the 
following parties.
 Not important at all extremely important
Party a 0↓↓↓1↓↓↓2↓↓↓3↓↓↓4↓↓↓5↓↓↓6↓↓↓7↓↓↓8↓↓↓9↓↓↓10
Party B 0↓↓↓1↓↓↓2↓↓↓3↓↓↓4↓↓↓5↓↓↓6↓↓↓7↓↓↓8↓↓↓9↓↓↓10
Format repeated for each of the following issues:
Deregulation
Redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor
Civil liberties vs. law and order
Social lifestyle (e.g. homosexuality)
Religious principles in politics
Immigration policy
Integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation)
Urban vs. rural interests
Cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism
Decentralization to regions/localities
U.S. power in world affairs
ethnic minorities
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